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ABSTRACT 
In  production agriculture, good man;lsement is demonstrated by  protits that are persistently 
preater  than  those  of  similar  neighboring  farms. This  research  examined  the  el'fecta  of 
management practices  on  risk-adjusted  protit per acre for Kansas f;~rrns  over  1990-1999. 
The management practices were price, cost. yield, planting intensity, and technology adop- 
tion (less-tillage). Cost management. planting  intensity, and  technology  adoption had  the 
greatest  effect  on  prclfit  per  acre, and  cash  price  mitnagement  was  found  to  have  the 
aniallest impact.  If producers  wish to have continuo~~sly  high profits, their efforts are best 
spent in  management prz~ctices  over which they have the most control. 
Key Words: fort??  tnantr~yi.eriicrit,  ti~urXetitig.  risk, te~~I~tio/o,~~  u(ioptior7. 
The removal of target price payments wrought 
by  the  1996 Freedorn  to  Farm  bill  has  in- 
creased farmers'  and policy  makers'  interest 
in ~narketing  issues. As evidence of this. a new 
Risk Management Agency within the U.S. De- 
partment of Agriculture was created to allocate 
resources in the area of  marketing  and finan- 
cial risk management ti)r agricultut-a1 produc- 
ers. However, if the recently increased interest 
in  marketing issues results in  farmers "trying 
to pick  high prices in  the futures market,"  it 
could mean disappointment for those farmers. 
Empirical  evidence supporting efficient grain 
futures suggests that  it  is  difticult  to  garner 
abnormal protits trading futures (e.g., Garcia, 
Hudson, and  Waller; Kastens and Schroeder; 
Kolb,  1992, 1996; Tomek; Zulauf and Irwin). 
Further, that difficulty may be increasing (Kas- 
tens and  Schroeder). This is  not  to say  that 
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opportunities do not exist in  the futures mar- 
kets. Indeed, Wisner, Blue, and Baldwin point 
to a number of trading strategies that have dis- 
tinct protit-increasing potential as long as they 
can be recognized ex ante. 
Even if  grain futures markets are generally 
efficient, strategies involving cash markets or 
cash and futures markets may  still be protit- 
able.  A  comprehensive  study  assessing  this 
possibility  is  the  ongoing  study  of  AgMAS 
(Agricultural  Marketing  Advisol-y  Services), 
which began  in  1994 at  the University of  11- 
linois atid  focuses on evaluating the cash and 
futures strategies of over 20 marketing advi- 
sory services which sell their advice to agri- 
culturai producers. Generally. an examination 
of  the  various  papers  and  reports  at  the 
AgMAS website  reveals  that  it  is  extremely 
difficult  to  consistently  "beat  the  market" 
over tirne, even for those who are profession- 
ally involved. 
When it comes to acquiring favorable crop 
prices, might it be that those in the know sim- 
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would  be in  their best  interest to keep quiet. 
Certainly  that  idea  is  consistent  with  Zulauf 
and Irwin, who note that ". . . evidence exists 
that  individuals can beat the market. although 
the  number  who  can  consistently  do so is 
small. The primary attributes of these individ- 
uals are that  they have superior access to in- 
formation  and/or  possess  superior  analytical 
ability."  (p. 327) 
The impetus of this research was the desire 
to find and learn about farin managers who are 
superior crop marketers. The scopc of the re- 
search is a group of over 1000 Kansas farms 
that  are principally  engaged  in  crop produc- 
tion.  Because  "good"  marketing  is only one 
aspect of successful farm management, this re- 
search  examines  a  number  of  management 
traits or factors that together comprise "good" 
management. After first discussing the idea of 
good management, the objective is to a) de- 
termine which management traits most clearly 
distinguish producers. ancl  b) quantify the irn- 
pact  on  profitability  expected  by  managers 
who choose to change their nianagement strat- 
egies. 
Good Management 
What  is  good  management'!  As used  in  this 
research, good management, or economic suc- 
cess, is  "persistently  achieving greater profits 
than  one's  neighbors  across years."'  For  ag- 
ricultural  producers.  what  defines  economic 
success'? Does  it  have  to  do  with  obtaining 
higher yields, lower costs, 01-  higher prices? Is 
it perhaps related to better use of tixed assets 
such as land. that is, planting intensity'? Or is 
it  related  more closely  to knowing  when  to 
adopt  new  technologies? On the  other hand, 
might  more  intrinsic farm  factors, less  under 
the  control  of  the  current  farin  manager but 
perhaps not i-ully capitalized into asset values, 
be a more important determinant of profit dif- 
' Though our focus here is profits, bec:iusc  expect- 
ccl-utility-based succcss is judgcd  on the basis of  risk 
as well as profit we explicitly consider risk in our anal- 
ysis. We  use the colloquial term nciglrhot..~  to indicate 
thr~ners  in the same geographical area with comparable 
farming operations-those  who are most  likely  to bc 
compctinp for production  inputs such as Parrn  land. 
ferences among fiirnms?  One example is gov- 
ernment program payments, which are largely 
determined  by  base  acreages  and  program 
crop yields established in the early 1980s. 
The issue facing farm  managers  is  where 
to focus their management efforts. Mishra, El- 
Osta, and Johnson  examined which manage- 
ment aspects would lead to above-average re- 
turns. They found that costs, technology, farm 
diversification, mar-keting, and far111  ownership 
all had  a significant impact on the success of 
a farm. However. as a producer, is it easier to 
lower cost,  increase  crop yields,  or increase 
planting  intensity'? Does  adopting  new  tech- 
nologies  more  quickly  or  "picking"  good 
prices  have a  larger  impact  on profitability'! 
While  increasing costs  likely  reduces profit- 
ability, it should not be a foregone conclusion. 
After all.  increased  ust:  of fertilizer or herbi- 
cide might increase crop yield, thus  revenue 
or crop price  (e.g., by  increasing the  crop's 
protein  content).  Clearly,  the  farm  manager 
must  consider  many  tradeoffs between  costs 
and income in  an el'fort  to maximize protit. 
In short. some management goals might be 
hard  to  achieve yet have large payoffs-pro- 
ducers  must  determine  the  tradeoffs.  Zulauf 
and Irwin asserted that the producers who sur- 
vive will  be the ones with  the lowest cost of 
production.  Of  course, yields and technology 
also impact the per-unit cost of prociuction, po- 
tentially  clouding the issue. One of the ob$ec- 
tives of this  research  is to break  apart these 
different  aspects  affecting  per-unit  costs. 
Therefore,  costs.  yields,  and  technology  are 
considered  as  separate  variables  impacting 
profitability. In that regard this work is related 
to non-parametric studies of  management ef- 
ficiency.  Comparing a set of  farms to a  rep- 
resentative or average farm will yield similar 
conclusions  as  comparing  the  same  set  of 
farms to an efficiency locus. Hence, the yield 
variable is similar to technical efficiency and 
the cost variable  is  similar to allocative efti- 
ciency.' 
'  A  PI-oducel-  is ttchnically eflicient if  an increase 
in any OLI~PLI~  rciluircs a reduction in  at least one othel- 
o~~tput  or an  increase  in  at  Ieaht  one input  and  if  a 
rctluction  in any  input require.;  an incrcace  in :ct  least The efficiency literature shows that reduced 
efficiency decreases economic profit, and allo- 
cative efficiency  and scale efficiencies impact 
econoniic  protit  more  significantly  than  tech- 
nical  efficiency  (e.g.,  Chavas  and  Aliber). 
Therefore, an important way for less profitable 
farms  to  increase  economic  profits  is  by  de- 
creasing costs (increasing allocative efficiency). 
Featherstone, Langemeier, and Isinet found that 
profitability  was  positively  correlated  to  tech- 
nical, allocative, and scale efficiency. Rowland 
et al. reported  similar findings. 
While efficiency  studies are comparable to 
this research, they typically compare individual 
farms to the  "best"  farm  in terms of each ef- 
ficiency measure. The "best"  farm may or may 
not  be representative of what all farms are ca- 
pable of achieving. In addition, efficiency stud- 
ie\ offer little to asse\\ the relative ease or co\t 
of changing management strategie5. That is, is 
it  easier  for  a  farm  to  improve  allocative  or 
technical  efficiency'!  And  which  inlprovement 
will enhance profits the  most'? By  considering 
the percentage of farms that are statistically dif- 
ferent  from  average.  by  each  factor,  this  re- 
search  should  help  a  farm  manager  decide 
where  to  focus  management  efforts.  That  is, 
kuowing  whether  many  or  only  a  few  farms 
have  been  able  to  achieve  the  goal  provides 
useful information to the manager. 
This research departs from that typically de- 
scribed  in  non-parametric  studies  of  manage- 
ment  efficiency  in  that  it  consider\ crop mar- 
keting,  technology  adoption,  government 
payments.  and  the  planting  intensity  of  crops 
as other measures by  which producers are dis- 
tinguished from their neighbors in terms of prof- 
itability. In  addition, risk  is considered  an  im- 
portant  profit  determinant.  That  is.  farmers 
often have to take on additional risk to obtain 
more profit. 
The history  of  agricultural  production  has 
been  one of  constant adjustment to new  tech- 
nologies. Over time, producers vary in the de- 
gree to  which  they  have  aclopted  a particular 
one other  input or a reduction  in  at  least one output 
(Koopmans p. 60). Allnccltive qfficic>tlc.y  is the extent to 
which input choices satisfy the marginal equivalelicies 
for cost minimization  (Greene p. 90). 
technology. That fact alone surely causes pro- 
ducers to wonder if  they  are adopting a tech- 
nology  at  the  optimal  rate.  Consequently,  it 
could be that farmers differentiate themselves 
from their neighbors by focusing on (or ignor- 
ing) new technologies. Empirical evidence sug- 
gests that farmers often adopt parts of the tech- 
nological  package  instead  of  the  whole 
(Leathers  and  Smale). This  suggests  that  al- 
though producers might test a new technology 
they  may  not  heavily  invest  in  it  until  it  has 
been  "proven."  Therefore,  economic  profit 
could  be  a  function  of  technology  adoption 
rate. 
Regardless  of  how  farmers  adopt  a  new 
technology  it  is  an  important  variable  that 
should be considered in  a description of what 
causes differences in profits among producers. 
It is likely that some technologies are only fea- 
sible for larger farms; therefore, there is some 
likelihood  that  size  economies exist  in  pro- 
duction agriculture. Thus farm size could be a 
reasonable indicator of a broad class of tech- 
nologies or, Inore appropriately, their adoption 
rates.  However.  farm  size may  be  similar to 
government payments in that its determination 
is often exogenous to the  current farm man- 
ager. Thus care should be taken in interpreting 
variables  such  as  government  payments  or 
farm size as  "management"  variables. 
Conceptual Model and Data 
A conceptual model to describe the degree of 
management superiority is 
prc?fit  = J' (prices, yie1cf.r. costs, technolog!  aclop- 
tion, plarttirlg  intensity, ,qoverninet?t  pcryments, farm 
size. clnd  risk), 
where  all  variables  are treated  as relative to 
one's neighbors or, more precisely, relative to 
an  appropriate  representative (average) farm. 
For example. the yields variable represents the 
degree to which a producer tends to have high- 
er or lower crop yields than  a representative 
or  average  farm  in  the  same  area  with  the 
same crop mix. 
It  is often  difficult to distinguish manage- 
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farming,  where  profitability  is heavily  influ- 
enced by  weather. Thus it is important to con- 
duct  a study  of  management  success from  a 
multi-year  standpoint. To  that end, this  study 
relies  on  the  10-year  Kansas  Management, 
Analysis, and Research (KMAR) data set. ob- 
tained by  a yearly  survey of farmers in  Kan- 
sas.  The  10-year  data  set  involves  financial 
and production information from approximate- 
ly  1000 producers who have participated con- 
tinuously in the farm management program for 
10 years  ( 1990- 1 999). The producers are lo- 
cated  in  six  geographical KMAR  regions  of 
Kansas. In  this research, the farms within any 
particular  region  are considered to  be  neigh- 
bors and are used  to construct an appropriate 
representative farm for each year. The KMAR 
database information was augmented with data 
from  Kansas Department  of  Agriculture's 
Kua.~as  Frzrrn  Fuct.~  and  the  Kansas  Farm 
Management Association's  The Enterprise 
Analysis Report  1999. 
Empirical Specification 
The model  conceptuali7ed  above can be em- 
piricall y specified as 
(  1 )  PROFIT, = P,, + P,COST,  + P,YIELU, 
where PROFIT, is a measure of long-run profit 
superiority  for  farm  i;  COST,,  YIELD,. 
PRICE,,  PLANT,.  and  GOVT, represent  the 
ability  of  farm  i to demonstrate management 
superiority, relative to its "neighbors,"  in the 
stated category; TECH, represents  how much 
ahead,  or  behind,  a  producer  is  at  adopting 
technology; SIZE, indicates relative farm size; 
RISK, represents  relative  income  variability; 
and F, denotes an error term.' 
The specific technology  considered  here is  less- 
tillage.  More  detail  is  provided  later.  For  continuity, 
GOVT is described as a management variable similar 
to the other variables.  As noted, however, differences 
in  government payments among farrners may  be  due 
more  to prior  than  to current  manngernent. Nonethe- 
less, omitting  GOVT would   result  in  biased estimates 
since it is a relevant variable in determining profit dif- 
ferences among farms. 
Profit 
Although economic profits are zero in the long 
run  for average producers.  superior managers 
may  reap positive  profits  in  the  long run.  In 
the  short run  differences in  economic profits 
among  managers  are  likely  even  larger.  Be- 
cause farms vary widely in scale of operation. 
per-acre rather than per-farm profits are used. 
The measure of profitability is 
C n,,, 
(2)  PROFIT,, = '  where 
T, 
(3)  ]I,,,  = NETREV,,, - NETREV,,, and 
where NETREV,,,  is the difference between the 
total  crop  income  (as given  by  the  KMAR 
data) and the total crop expense for farm  i in 
region j  year t. Total crop expense is the sum 
of  all crop expenses  (labor, machinery,  seed, 
fertilizer, marketing, herbicide, and irrigation 
costs) plus an interest (actual and opportunity) 
cost and owned and rented land charges. Land 
values are ascribed to the land every five years 
by the producer and the KMAR economist. To 
obtain yearly estimates of the land values un- 
derlying annual land costs. a state-wide yearly 
proportional  adjustment from Kansas Agricul- 
tural  Stati\tic\  is  used.  NETREV,,  depicts the 
average net  crop income per  acre (across all 
farms in region j  in  year t-the  benchmark for 
that region that year), and PROFIT,, is the av- 
erage (over T years, here  10) of profit  differ- 
enced from the annual benchmarks for farm i 
in region j." 
Generally,  the  independent  variables  are  de- 
fined  as follows; however,  technology  is  de- 
fined  in  the  following  section.  The  general 
form i\ 
Although  not  needed  in  the linal  estimable spec- 
ification  in  (I), the  location  indicator  (here, j) is re- 
tained throughout  the enipirical development to aid in 
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where  V, is the observed  value of  the vari- 
ables  COST, PRICE, YIELD, PLANT, GOVT, 
and  SIZE. EV,, is the expected V,,, (that of  the 
representative  farm) for  region j  in  year  r. 
%LlIFVAR,,, is the variable that has been "per- 
cent-differenced" from the neighbors. Vilr  and 
EV,, for all  variables  are defined  in Appendix 
A. as  is the risk  variable. 
The across-years  persistent  variable  appli- 
cable to the independent variables  in equation 
(1) is 
where,  once  again,  VAR,, refers  to  COST, 
PRICE.  YIELD.  PLANT,  GOVT, and  SIZE, 
and  is now the average percent  different from 
the  neighbors. The risk  variable  requires  no 
averaging  across time because  it  is computed 
as  a constant  across time. 
As representative of  technology  in general,  a 
technology that has been especially important 
for  Kansas farmers over the last  10-20  years 
was  considered-substitutillg  chemicals  for 
tillage.  A  less-tillage  index  (LT) was  estab- 
lished  as 
where  herb$,,, is  the  herbicide  expenditures 
and  rnuclz$,,, is the total  crop machinery own- 
ership and  operation costs for farm i in region 
,j  year  t.5 Defined this way, if a producer  did 
not use any machinery then LT would equal  1 
and  if the producer  used  only machinery and 
no herbicides the index would  equal 0. To get 
at  an average, or expected, rntc7  of  csdoption of 
this technology, LT was considered to be a lin- 
ear fiinction of  time in a series of  j  regressions: 
A  reviewer correctly  pointed out that LT,,, likely 
captures other  features  in  addition  to  less-tillage. for 
example crop rotation. We  have attempted to improve 
the accuracy  of  the less-tillage adoption  rate  variable 
by  adding planting intensity as a  separate variable. 
Farm that IS 2 years 
ahead tn  1994 
Farm that 1s  4 years 
behlnd In 1998 
90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99 
Year 
Figure  1.  Rate  of Less-tillage  Adoption, 
North  Central Kan\as  Example 
The  parameter  estimates  from  these  regres- 
sions  were then used  to determine the differ- 
ence  from  the  expected  adoption  rate  (in 
years) for each farm (see Figure  1  for an  ex- 
ample): 
TECHI,,, = LT,, - h, 
8, 
- t, 
where TECHI,,, is the number of  years  farm i 
in regionj and  year  t was ahead of  (or behind) 
its neighbors in terms of  less-tillage adoption. 
Finally.  the  technology  variable  consistent 
with that displayed  in (2) is 
C TECHI,,, 
(9)  TECH,,  ==  ' 
T 
Results 
To exanline  persistence  of management.  the 
mean  (across  the  10  annual  values,  1990- 
1999) for each management measure for each 
farm was  tested  to see  if it  was  statistically 
different from zero using a two-tailed t-test at 
the  95-percent  confidence level. The means, 
standard  deviations,  and  percent  of farms 
whose mean management measures were sig- 
nificantly different from zero are noted  in Ta- 
ble  1. Acres of  main crops (described in more 
detail in the appendix) is also included to help 
the reader better understand  the farm size and 
its variability within the data. 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics and Percent of  Farms with  Management Measures that are Sig- 
nificantly Different from Zero, 1020 Kansas Farms, 1990-1 999 
Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation  % Different.' 
PROFIT ($/acre)  0.00 
COST (% different from the expected cost)  0.00 
YIELD (% different from expected yield)  0.00 
PRICE ('ii  different from the expected price)  0.00 
TECH (no. of years ahead of neighbors)  0.00 
PLANT (% different from the average planting intensity)  0.00 
COVT (76 different fr.orn the average govt)  0.00 
SIZE (% different from average size)  0.00 
RISK (57  different from average risk)  0.00 
MCA (main crop acres)  832.30 
.' Percent of  f:lrm.;  whose  mean  (across I0  years) managemen1 measure  significantly differs frcrtn zero based  on a two- 
t;~iled  t-test ar  the  95-percent confidence level. 
agement. To maintain or enhance positive eco- 
nomic  profits.  a  frir111  must  first  differentiate 
itself from its neighbors in the right direction 
and across tirne. Among those categories con- 
sidered  most  under the control of the current 
managel;  Table  1  shows that over 50 percent 
of the farms had costs, planting intensity, and 
technology adoption rates significantly differ- 
ent from zero, and 47  percent had  profits sig- 
nificantly  different from  zero. This suggests 
that  producers  can  and  do  "manage"  these 
traits.  whereas yields and prices must be less 
"manageable"  or at least less managedh 
The Pearson's correlation matrix associated 
with equation (I)  variables is shown in  Table 
2. Each  of the  1020 observations underlying 
"RISK is  not  included  in the peraiste~~ce  analysis 
since  it is  intrinsically an  across-timc variable. 
Table 2 is an individual farm's  10-year average 
of the respective management factor. This ta- 
ble  shows that price relationships are among 
the weakest. The fact that  profit and price are 
not highly correlated  is somewhat surprising. 
However, considering that it [night be difficult 
for farm managers  to control the prices they 
receive  it  makes  sense that  profit  would  be 
correlated  stronger  with  variables  that  are 
more controllable-at  least in this "long run" 
( 10-year) setting. 
The OLS regression estimates for equation 
(1)  are  reported  in  Table  3.  Holding  other 
management  measures  constant,  for  each  1 
percent  higher  costs that  a  farm has than  its 
representative  farm, per-acre  profits  are  ex- 
pected  to be $0.61 lower. All coefficient esti- 
mates  are highly  significant except for price. 
It is worth noting that this regression indicates 
Table 2.  Pearson's Correlation Coefficients for Selected Variables,  1020 Kansas Farms 1990- 
1999 
Variable  COST  YIELD  PRICE  TECH  PLANT  GOVT  RlSK 
PROFIT  0.24"  0.23"  0.03  0.3  1"  0.28"  0.03 
COST  -0.02  0.0  1  -0.28":  -0.2  1 "  0.39" 
YIELD  0.03  0.25:':  0.23"'  -0. I  I " 
PRICE  0.074:  0.10"  -0.03 
TECH  0.2  1 "  -0.094' 
PLANT  -0.42" 
GOVT 
SIZE 
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Table 3.  Regression Results.  1020 Kansas Farms, 1990-1 999 
Impact on  Profitability from 
1  Standard Deviation Change 
Parameter  Standard  in  Management Category 
Variable  Estimate  Error  P Value  ($/acre)  - 
COST  -0.6  1 :;:  0.08  0.00  -- 18.30 
YIELD  0.48*  0.14  0.00  7.15 
PRICE  -0.12  0.22  0.59  -  1.02 
TECH  0.4  1  2K  0.15  0.0  I  5.78 
PLANT  0.58:':  0.10  0.00  13.57 
GOVT  0.08*  0.03  0.00  7.10 
SIZE  0.25:*  0.03  0.00  19.95 
RISK  0.35  0.03  0.00  23.56 
'::  Significantly diffel-en1  Irotn  zero at the 95-percent confidence  level. The model  R2  is 0.32 
that increasing a farm's crop price by  I  percent 
compared to the representative farm would de- 
crease  profit  by  a  statistically  insignificant 
$0.12 per acre-a  surprise given that changes 
in  price essentially go directly  to the bottom 
line.'  Likely this is a conditionality issue. Giv- 
en that price is expected to impact profitability 
but  is  not  found  to,  and given  that  it  is not 
generally correlated  with other individual ex- 
planatory  variables, it must be the case that it 
is systematically  related  to some combination 
of other explanatory variables. Farms that con- 
sistently get different  price\ than their neigh- 
bors  must  have  offsetting  impacts on profit- 
ability  from other management traits.  This is 
consistent  with  the  idea  that  farms  getting 
higher prices than  their neighbors must sacri- 
fice  something. Farms  might  trade  off  price 
and  some combination of  other management 
facton. Such an explanation would be consis- 
tent  with  the zero impact  of  price  on protit- 
ability as well as the gener-ally zero correlation 
'  Earlier it  asserted that difkrences in  govern- 
ment program  payments are intrinsic rather than  man- 
aged.  In  1998 iund  1999,  substantial  loan deficiency 
I'ayrnenLs  within  thc  GOVT measure  imply  that  this 
variable has marketing management i~nplications  along 
with  PKICE. Nonetheless.  results reported  here do not 
substantially differ from the  1997 analysis by  Nivens, 
Kastens.  and Dhuyvetter.  Howcver, in  the  1907 ancil- 
ysis.  government payments  were not  included, but  an 
intercept was. When the I997 analysis was revisited in 
a framework  compatible with the current one. the re- 
sirlts remained robust  over time. 
between  price  and  other  explanatory  vari- 
able~.~ 
A  I-percent increase in risk  (standard de- 
viation in net farm income) will increase profit 
by  $0.35  per  acr-e. This  implies  that  for in- 
creased profits a farmer must increase risk, and 
some farmers forgo increased  profits  for de- 
creased risk. 
Results in Table 3 are consistent with econ- 
omies of  size for Kansas farms. That is, after 
Examination  of  multicollinearity  was  inconclu- 
sive at best. The condition  index test of Belsley et al. 
(1980) suggerts vi~lucs  greater than 20 indicate a prob- 
lern.  Here  the  I:lrgesI  condition  index  w:rs  2.49.  The 
varinncc decomposition test  (Belsley et  al.) examines 
the proportion of variance for an independent  variable 
aswciatcd  with  each  char;~cteristic  root,  with  values 
above 0.5 indicating a possible problern. Hcre 3 of 64 
(8 independent variables, 8 roots) values were grr;rter 
than  0.5, with  one (for the  PRICE  variable) at  0.82. 
indicating  a  potential  problern.  A  third  "test,"  hug- 
gested by  GI-ecne (I993),  is that multicollinearity may 
be a problem  if  the overall  K'  in  the regression is less 
than the  R' values associated  with  regressing each in- 
dependent variable on  all  other independent variables. 
Here the overall  R'  was 0.32. \vhercas  the 8 auxiliary 
R'  values  ranged  from  0.02 to 0.33. which  does not 
seem particularly  convincing of  a problem.  More im- 
portantly, the PRICE K' was only 0.02. A fourth "test" 
suggests that  in  the  presence  of  multicollinearity  co- 
efficient  estimates  change  substantially  for  srnall 
changes  in  the data. We re-estimated  the  rnc>del 500 
time.;. each time throwing out a random  10 percent of 
thc data. For each coefficient hut PRICE, the 500-oh- 
servation  mean  was  within  0.02  of  the  estimate  re- 
ported in Table 1 (PRICE was within 0.04).  Certainly. 
it  does not  appear that  disentangling the PRICE  rela- 
tionships  is particularly straightforw;~rd. accounting  for  other  management  measure\. 
the SIZE parameter estimate suggests that for 
each percent  a farm is larger than neighboring 
farm\ (i.e., the average farm size in the region) 
that farm is expected to receive an  additional 
$0.2S/acre profit. 
The rightmost column of Table 3 shows the 
impact on profitability associated with a one- 
standard-deviation change  from  the  mean  in 
each  management  category.  For  example, a 
one-standard-deviation change from the mean 
for yield  management was acsociated  with  a 
$7.1  Slacre  change  in  profits.  Clearly,  being 
one  standard  deviat~on  away  from  the  mean 
for costs and planting intensity was rnore valu- 
able than  being  good  at attaining  high  yields 
or being a forerunner in  technology adoption 
and especially  more profitable then being one 
standard deviation away from the mean, price- 
wise. Interestingly, being one standard devia- 
tion away from the mean of risk has the high- 
est  impact  on  profits,  indicating that  f.  'irlners 
who want to increase profits should not over- 
look  the possibility  that they  may  need to be 
willing to take on more risk. Since being one 
standard deviation away fl-om the mean is as- 
sumed to happen  with  equal  likelihood. then 
it  can  be  asserted  that it  should be  easier to 
generate  higher  profits  by  focusing  manage- 
ment  on  costs, planting  intensity, less-tillage 
adoption, and yields.  rather  than  by  focusing 
on crop price. 
Conclusion 
This research sought to determine which man- 
agement traits are most important in determin- 
ing profitability and  in  segregating producers 
by  profitability.  Because  average  producers 
garner zero economic profits  in the long-run, 
producers must  differentiate themselves froin 
their  neighbors, and in the right  direction, in 
order to be  profitable.  In  this research,  1020 
Kansas farms were examined from 1990-1 999 
using measures that distinguish producers 
from their neighbors (a representative farm) in 
terms  of  production  costs.  yields,  prices  re- 
ceived.  planting  intensity,  government  pay- 
ments,  rate  of  technology  (less-tillage) adop- 
tion, farm size. and risk (income variability). 
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Over the entire  10-year period, more than 
50 percent of the farms were significantly dif- 
ferent. either better or worse, than their neigh- 
bors  in  terms  of  cost  management,  planting 
intensity, government payments, rates of less- 
tillage  adoption, and  farm size. On  the other 
hand,  47  percent  of  the  farms  were  able to 
distinguish themselves from their neighbors in 
terms of crop profits. and only 35 percent and 
24  percent  in  terms  of  yields  and  price,  re- 
spectively. These  results  are consistent  with 
yields being  more random, or harder to man- 
age, than  costs,  planting  intensity,  and  tech- 
nology adoption and price being more random 
still. In that sense, price appears to be the least 
manageable  factor  in  this  data set. However, 
in  this analysis, prices are not exactly synon- 
ymous  with  crop  marketing.  Indeed, if  gov- 
ernment payments were considered a market- 
ing variable, then the conclusion would be that 
it is possible  to distinguish oneself with crop 
marketing. 
In  a  regression  framework,  persistently 
having  increased  risk,  low  costs  relative  to 
neighboring farms, high yields, greater plant- 
ing  intensity,  higher  government  payments, 
larger farm size, and persistently  being ahead 
of  one's  neighbors  in  less-tillage  adoption 
were each important drivers of  relative prof- 
itability.  However,  having persistently  higher 
cash  prices  than one's  neighbors did not sig- 
nificantly impact profitability. Thus, insofar as 
government  payments  and  farm size may  be 
outside the control  of  the current farm man- 
ager, it appears that it should be easier for pro- 
ducers to enhance profits by focusing on costs, 
planting  intensity,  less-tillage  adoption,  and 
yields  than  on  price. This is  not  to  say  that 
price received  is absolutely unimportant, only 
that  we  have not  found  much  evidence indi- 
cating that farni managers are generally  able 
to profitably differentiate themselves from oth- 
er farms when it comes to price. 
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Appendix A 
The cost variable  in  (1) is designed to capture the 
tendency  fi~r  a  farrn  to have higher or lower crop 
input costs than the representative farm. Crop input 
costs include machinery costs, seed, fertili~er,  mar- 
keting,  hrrbicicic.  fuel, rent  (actual or opportunity 
depending on whether land is rented or owned), and 
labor (paid  and unpaid) cost. Crop input costs are 
intrinsically  different  lor different  crops. For ex- 
ample. farms that grow irrigated cot-n would not be 
expected to have the same costs as those growing 
non-irrigated  wheat. Thus what is needed is a niea- 
sure of a representative cost for a given farm's crop 
mix with  an average manager.  For that, enterprise 
budget values from The Etzterprise Analysis Report 
1999 were used, along with each farm's crop mix 
of  main  crop acres  (rnain crops are irrigated  and 
non-irrigated  wheat,  corn,  grain  sorghum,  soy- 
beans.  and alfalfa).  Ultimately, to get at  manage- 
ment superiority  actual costs must be compared to 
the representative costs. Relevant actual  costs are 
given by 
Americrrrz  Journc~l oj' Agric.ultctra1  Ec,orzotnir..s 
733  199  1 ):735-742.  (Al)  CROPCOST,,,  = EXPENSE,,, X 
,  '"I 
Miahra, A. K., H. S. El-Ost;~.  and  J. D. Johnson. 
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signed to the main crops for farm i in region j  ancl  cost"  is  defined  as (equivalent to equation  (5) in 
year  r.'  It  is the  ratio of  main  crop acres (MCA,jl)  the body of the paper)" 
to total  crop acres (TCA,,) multiplied  by  the total 
recorded  crop expense  for all  crops on farm i  in  CROPCOSTi,, 
region j  and year r  (EXPENSE,,,).  (AS)  COSTPA,,,  =  -  1  X  100. 
PREDICTCOSTij, 
The first  step in  deriving a representative  cost-  1 
per-main-crop acre is developing an annual cost r:l-  Finally, to  arrive at  the  cost  variable  in  (I)  that 
tio  to  adjust  1999 enterprise costs to provide esti-  defines per,yi,yle,,t management, the cost  in 
mates for the previous years:"'  (AS) iu averaged across years for each farm (ecluiv- 
where  AVGCOST, is  the state average  (across all 
farms  and  regions  in  year  r)  cost-per-main-crop 
acre, and other variables are as already defined. The 
next step in deriving a representative cost-per-main- 
crop acre for each farm-year depends on 
ENTERPRISE,, X  AC,,,, 
(A3)  MCE,,, =  " 
MCA,,, 
where  MCE,,, is  the  representative per-acre  main 
crop expense for farm i in region J  in  year t in  1999 
dollars. ENTERPRISE,, is T!L~  Enterprise, Ana1y.si.r 
Report  1999 cost data for region j  and main crop 
k."  AC,,,, is the acres planted for farm i in region J 
to main crop k in year r.  The representative cost in 
1999 dollars  is  adjusted  to provide  estimates  fhr 
other years using 
A VGCOST, 
(A4)  PREDICTCOST,,, = MCE,,, X 
A VGCOST,,  ' 
where PREDICTCOST,,, is the predicted crop costs 
for farm i in region j  and year t. It is representative 
of  a farm's  crop cost (per main  crop acre) for an 
average manager for each year, given the crops ac- 
tually planted that year. 
A  cost-per-acre  management  variable,  COST- 
PA,,,,  in  "percent  different  from the representative 
"To focus  on  farms  with  a  niqority  of  acres  in 
main  crops.  if  MCA,,,ITCA,, was less than 0.5 for any 
year  the  farm  was  deleted  (this criteria  removed  ap- 
proximately  6 percent of the total farms). 
"'The  annual  enterprise  report  depicts  average 
costs and  returns  for the  KMAR  subset  reporting  en- 
terprise  accounts.  Insufficient  historical  enterprise re- 
ports caused us to use an adjusted 1999 report for year.; 
before  1999. 
When  region  cnterprise  budget  data  were  not 
available, state enterprise hudgets were used. 
where T equals  10 in this research. 
For an example, take farm i, in region  1, which 
has  150 total  acres with  a total  cost of production 
of  $15,802.50 in  1995. It has 50 acres of non  irri- 
gated  wheat,  30 acres  of  irrigated  corn,  and  20 
acres of non-irrigated  grain sorghum; the other 50 
acres are some "other"  crop (i.e.. not a main crop). 
Multiplying the total cost of production by the ratio 
of total acres to main crop acres (in this case main 
cropsare corn, grain sorghum, and wheat since this 
producer does not  produce soybeans or alfalfa) re- 
sults in a cost of production for the main crop acres 
of  $10,535, or $105.35/acre for the cropcost value 
in  (Al). 
Using  The  Enterpri.te  A1za1ysi.s  Rc.port  19YY 
budgets, if  farm i  planted  the  same acres in  1999 
as in 1995, its total costs would be  expected to be 
$10,995.70,  or  f6109.96kacre. Following  equation 
(a4), to derive representative costs for this farm in 
1995: the  1999 value is  multiplied  by  the ratio of 
statewide cost per  acre  in  1995 to statewide cost 
per  acre in  1999; in  this case the ratio is  0.8823. 
Thus the representative cost per  acre for  1995 is 
$97.02 (PREDICTCOST in A4). The actual cost per 
acre observed for farm i in  1995 was $105.35 (the 
CKOPCOST  in  AS).  Finally,  the  1995  costs  for 
"  Management  measures  defined  in  this  research 
were designed to conceptually center on zero. Empir- 
ically  derived  proxies  are  rarely  identically  zero, al- 
though  they  are close. To  make statistical  tests around 
zero appropriate some normalization was inevitably re- 
qui~.cd.  In each ca\e. linear as opposed to proportional 
nornlalizations were  usetl. For example, belhre use in 
(AS), each observation on PREI)ICTCOST,,, from (A4) 
was  ad-justed 
(by region by 
COST,,).  This 
by  adding  the  appropriate across-farms 
year) mean, (CKOPCOST,, -  PREDICT- 
caused actual cost measures to center on 
cxpccted cost measures by  each region each year. Sub- 
sequently, after deriving COSTP..\,,,  in  (AS), that series 
was differenced with ils mean (by region each year). farm  i in region  1 are 8.6 percent greater than the  where the county subscript is dropped because it is 
representative costs (the COSTPA in AS).  no longer needed. To get at an overall (across main 
crops) measure of yield superiority, the yield index 
Yiel~1  in (AY)  is weighted by crop acres to become a new 
yield  variable  YLD,,,:14 
Since  different  crops  have  intrinsically  different 
yields  per  acre,  comparing  aggregated  yield  data 
without  first  normalizing  for each crop would  be 
inappropriate. So crop yields were first determined 
by farm. region, crop, and year: 
PROD,,,, 
(A7)  YLDK,,,, = -, 
A C,,,, 
where  YLDK,,,, is the yield  for crop k  for farm i in 
region j  and year t, defined in terms of production 
(PROII)  per acre (AC). 
Expected farm-level crop yields in Kansas vary 
widely geographically due to weather. It  would be 
inappropriate  to  expect  all  farrns  in  the  same 
KMAR region to have the same yield  for a  given 
crop. Thus the expected yield  for crop k  of  farm i 
in county c of region J in year t, EYLDK,,,,,, is taken 
to  be  the  regional  average  (across farm)  annual 
yield, as adjusted  by  county where the farm is  lo- 
cated: 
CYLD,,,, 
(A8) EYLDK  ,,,,,  = m~,,,  x =-, 
CYLD,,, 
Finally, to arrive at the across-years yield  variable 
depicted in (I)  (equivalent to (6)): 
C  YLD,,, 
(A l  I )  YIELD,, = L- 
7 
Like the cost and yield  measures in  (I  ),  the price 
measure also depends on actual and representative 
values.  A  measure  of  the  representative  value of 
main crop production  for farm i in region j  in year 
t for an average manager,  EXPVALUE,,,, is 
C YLDh,,,,, x AC,,,, x PR<kl 
(A  12) EXPVA  LUE,,,  =  " 
MCA,,, 
where PR,,, is a cou~~ty  price for the county where 
farm  i  is  located, and for crop k  in  year  r.15  Other 
variables  in  (A12) have  already been defined. As  where YLDK,,, is the across-farms average yield for 
with  costs and yields, a  "different  from the repre-  crop k  in  region j  year  r.  CYLD,,,, is crop k  yield 
sentative"  index is derived as 
for county c  in region J  in  year  t, and CYLD,,, is 
the average county yield  across all counties in  re- 
gion j."  An appropriate "different  from expected"  (~13)  CKOPVAL,,,  = 
GROSSVALUE,,, 
yield  variable is then  EXP VALUE,,, 
County  yield  data  (CYLL))  are  from  Krrnstrs 
Farm  Frrcrs.  Farm-level  yEdata  (YLIjK)  are  from 
the KMAR data set. Thus YLDK,,,  is an average across 
individual  farms  and  CYLD,,,  is  an  average  across 
counties. Both  averages are  for crop k  in  farm  man- 
agement region j in year t. County yields were not used 
directly  for expected farm yields  hecnuse the ratio  of 
average  KMAR  yields to average county  yield  varied 
by  crop. That is.  KMAR farms were  relatively  hetter 
at attaining high yields than  farms sampled by  Kansas 
Agricultural  Statistics-for  some crops. llsing county 
yields  as  direct  expectations  would  bias  the  general 
yield management  variables  in  equation (A8) in  favor 
of  farms that raised  more of  the crops where  KMAR 
farm\ were generally  better at attaining high yields 
where  CROPVAL,,, is the percent that  farm i's (in 
region B  and year t)  crop value is  above or below 
the representative value. and GROSSVALUEij,  is de- 
rived  from  KMAR-reported  gross  value  of  crop 
production.'-gain,  to arrive  at  the  across-years 
price superiority measure in  (1) (equivalent to (6)): 
"  The  yield  management  series in  (A 10).  YLIl,j,, 
was subsequently  differenced with its mean (by region 
each year). 
Is Crop prices for crop reporting districts from Kr~n- 
.rrr.s  Farm  F~rcts  wcre  adjusted  to  each  county  using 
government  farm  program  loan  price  differentials re- 
ported  by  the Kansas office of USDA's  Ftrrrrr  Srrvice.r 
Agcn~:\>. 
I*  KMAR-reported total  crop value  (reported crop 
sales if  crop sold before December 31  each year, else 
"marked  to  market"  on Decembcr 3 1) is adjusted for 204  Journnl c~f'A,yric~ultural  ur~d  Applied  economic,.^, April 2002 
CROPVAL,,,  of  the government payments  in  region j  for year t 
(A14)  PRICE,, =  ' 
7 
(i.e., the benchmark). The across years government 
payment4  variable  associated  with  eq~~ation  (1) IS 
(equivalent to (6)): 
Plurzting  Inten.sit-Y  C ~ovij, 
(A19) GOVT,, = 
To  obtain the planting  intensity variable associated  T 
with  equation  (1) actual  and espected planting in- 
tensity variables were defined. The actual planting 
intensity variable is defined by  Size 
C AC,,,,  In  this research, what is  most relevant is not how 
[AIS) PL,,, = +,  absolutely  large  farm  i is,  rather  how  large  it  is 
7 CA ,,,  relative to its neighbors. The annual percent differ- 
ence-in-main-crop-acres  variable,  %DIFMCA,!,,  is 
where the numerator is the total acres harvested and  defined by 
the denominator is the total cropland acres. The an- 
nual  percent  d~fference-~n-plant~ng-1nten51ty  varl- 
able, PLANTI,,, is defined by  (A20)  %DIFMCA,,, 
- 
-  1).100, 
where MCA,, is the average farm size (in terms of 
(A  16) PLANTI,,, - -  - 
main crop acres) in region j  and year t. The acroas- 
years farm size variable applicable to equation  ( I) 
where PL,, is the average (expected) planting inten-  is (equivalent to (6)): 
sity for region j  in year t. The across years planting 
intensity  variable  associated  with  eq~~ation  (I) is  2 %DIFMCA,,, 
(equivalent to (6)):  (A21  )  SIZE,, = 
T 
PLA NTI,,, 
(A  17)  PLANT,, =  ' 
T  Risk 
Govrt-i~mer~t  Payment  The final  variable  depicted  in  (I) is  income risk, 
i.e..  the  standard deviation in  farm income across 
years. This is defined as 
'The  annual  percent  difference-in-payments  var- 
able, GOV,,, is defined by 
(  1)  x  In,,  (AIX)  GOV,!,  =  ---- -  (A22) ST/>,, = 
where  PAY,,, is the government payments received  - 
by farm i  in region j  for year t. PAY, is the average 
the  proportion  a farm's  main  crop\ acres are of  total 
crop  acres.  Following  footnote  12,  EXPVALUE  in 
(A12) uas normalized  so that  its  mean  eq~~aled  the 
mean  of  GROSSVALUE by  region  by  year. Price,, in 
(A14) was subsequently  differenced  with its mean (hy 
region  by  year).  The  only  price  variable  available 
(GROSSVALCIE,,,) is  somewhat limiting  given  it  tells 
nothing  about  the  marketing  strategy  of  the  producer 
and only the total value of  crops produced  in  a given 
year. 
where II,,,  is defined in equation (4) in the body  of 
the paper and is the profit  difference from the an- 
nual  benchmark farm. n,,  is the average profit  dif- 
ference for farm i across years. STL),, is the standard 
deviation of profit for farm i in region j.  The across- 
years risk variable applicable equation (1): 
where  RISK, is  the  relative  risk  of  farm  i  to  its 
neighbors in region j. 